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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                      MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
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                            NASHVILLE DIVISION
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     PATRICIO JARA,
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         Plaintiff,
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                                        ) 3:20-cv-00131
         v.
                                          JUDGE RICHARDSON
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     TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY,
          Defendant.
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         BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELI J. RICHARDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
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                        TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                             NOVEMBER 4, 2022
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                          TRIAL VOLUME IV of IV
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The above-styled cause came on to be heard at 9:23 a.m. on November 4, 2022, before the Honorable Eli J. Richardson, District Judge, when the following proceedings were had, to-wit:

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THE COURT: All right. We are here for Day 4 of trial in Jara vs. Tennessee State University. Getting a late start because there was a motion filed this morning, plaintiff's motion to modify jury instructions and verdict form.

Has the defendant had an opportunity to review this?

MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. We got a copy from the Court when we got here.

THE COURT: All right. Have you been able to form an opinion on your view about this?

MS. CARTER: We can speak to it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me make a few comments and we'll go from there. The first thing that I want to note is this: One thing about this, the defendant is referred to as the (capital G) government, and that's problematic. In federal litigation, I'm just going to say every single time capital G is referenced, the proper reference is only to the United States of America. And I do

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think it's not -- in this case, it's not just sort of a
 1
     formalism thing.
                       I do think federal judges, if you say "the
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 3
     government, " they going to think you're referring to the
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     federal government, period, and not an agency of a particular
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     state.
                But substantively, this matters because the EEOC's
 6
     quidance is federal quidance. It is not the State of
 7
     Tennessee's guidance, and it's certainly not TSU's guidance.
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                Would you agree with that, Mr. Bigelow?
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                              Your Honor, I would -- I will --
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                MR. BIGELOW:
     first of all, I appreciate the -- I obviously did not realize
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     that; otherwise, I wouldn't have done that.
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13
                THE COURT:
                            Yeah. And I don't mean to -- you
     know, I don't mean to sound like the smartest guy in the room
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     on that, but I do think it's a heads-up, and I think it will
15
    be a helpful heads-up in the future but -- for you.
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17
                But on the substantive piece, right, this is
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     Tennessee State University's guidance, the EEOC's guidance.
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                              I believe it is. In fact, the --
                MR. BIGELOW:
     TSU has an EEOC office that follows EEOC procedures and
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     investigates based on the -- I mean, it's actually called the
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     EE -- I believe --
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23
                THE COURT:
                           But you cited me something from the
24
     EEOC, right?
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That's correct.

MR. BIGELOW:

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THE COURT: So it's from the EEOC, right? It's not Tennessee State -- now, if you'd have cited me something from a TSU document, then I might say, well, it's their guidance although even then, we could probably parse through it and say it's just TSU passing on the EEOC's guidance.

But here, the only thing we have is a citation to the EEOC. And so I think, you know, whatever the merits of your argument here -- and I think there is none, but we'll talk about that.

But, you know, I just am concerned that in addition to making your argument, you're like, you know, treating the defendant like it's gone against its own guidance. And I think that that's not a fair way to put this. You know what I mean?

Like, if you want to make your argument, I think that's great, but when you're accusing a party of, quote, ignoring its own guidance, better be careful. And I just don't see where this is Tennessee State's own guidance. I mean, it's EEOC guidance.

MR. BIGELOW: Your Honor, I believe that the -which is why I made the argument, obviously -- that they
followed -- that Tennessee State University follows the
EEOC's guidance. Now, I suppose I should have put in
document --

THE COURT: But they're -- like, if they're

following the guidance, then I -- you know, it's probably because they kind of feel that they have to do so. But it's still the EEOC's guidance, right?

Now, if you had cited me to something that really was a TSU document, okay, so -- and I don't think we need to spend more time on that; I'm just kind of a little bit concerned. I just didn't see where we had any guidance put out by the defendant where they should be, you know, upbraided for ignoring their own guidance.

But be that as it may, there still is a substantive issue, and we'll talk about that and give each party their say.

What's the defendant's take on this?

MS. CARTER: We have a few points, Your Honor.

This idea of perception and perceiving a specific person as foreign-born, if plaintiffs are going to argue this, I would have expected to hear these types of questions through the trial for the witnesses.

THE COURT: And, of course, it's too late for them to argue anything right now, right?

MS. CARTER: Correct.

THE COURT: So they don't get to argue anything.

It's only a question of what should go in the jury instructions based on the law and what's happened, but go ahead.

MS. CARTER: So I think it would be highly prejudicial. At this point, the jury instructions include what it appears plaintiff is attempting to argue, which is Jury Instruction No. 2 speaks to the jury's duties. Jury Instruction No. -- I can't remember if it's 4 or 6 now; I apologize. I think it's 6 talks about attorneys' statements not being evidence.

And, you know, the verdict form has already been submitted to the jury. Obviously, it's highly prejudicial if we change the wording of the jury verdict at this point. It draws a -- it highlights, perhaps, something that the jury is going to look at and go, oh, maybe we should be doing this.

Counsel, throughout his argument to the jury in closing argument, talked about common sense and what the jury should do with the evidence.

He hasn't told the jury anything about perception. There is nothing that has been raised in this case using the word "perception," but he has used that throughout his case. So the defendant's position is this is not -- that the jury instructions should stand as they are to the jury. The jury was told to use their common sense. We believe they will do that.

There is nothing here that talks about -- or, you know, the jury instructions about treating government and individuals equal, speaks to counsel's argument about them

believing my statements which, again, are not evidence in the case over counsel's case.

And, you know, more importantly, I think this is kind of late at this point. If he had a question about anything that I said to the jury, the time to have raised that would have been in rebuttal. They get the last word. So this is all about oral argument to the jury, which is not evidence in the case and which is not going to be considered by the jury as evidence in the case.

And again, I just think it's really prejudicial.

Counsel wanted to use the verdict form as it was. If he had an issue with it, then it should have been changed before it got published to the jury.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I have a few thoughts. First of all, I absolutely believe this is too late. And if it was necessary to -- I'll allow Mr. Bigelow an opportunity to change my mind. It would be one thing if the instructions as written were wrong. No one thought they were wrong. At best, this proposal would be sort of an optional addition. But it's nothing in there is wrong as stated, nothing. And making sort of an optional change after counsel have, you know, made their arguments based on what we had already, I think it is prejudicial.

Why would this not be too late, Mr. Bigelow?

MR. BIGELOW: Your Honor, in -- my argument is

this: In both defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and, frankly, in defendant's opening, there was no focus on this.

This focus was done literally --

THE COURT: What focus?

MR. BIGELOW: The focus on actually proving -granted, we proved that Dr. Jara, that defendant knows

Dr. Jara is not from -- born in the United States. We have
proven that. But their argument is that we haven't proven
that the defendant knows all the -- where these other people
are from, which --

THE COURT: But your instructions don't say anything about that one way or the other, right? They don't -- they don't give any instructions about, you know, about how to view all these other professors and how they were treated that you had made part of your case. They don't say anything about that.

So adding actual or perceived, the instructions don't address the point that you're making which is about, you know, the relevance of the other professors. The instructions are all about whether the plaintiff was subject to discrimination based on national origin. And they don't have any applicability to, you know, the arguments related to other professors who supposedly were in the same boat.

That's the way I see it. But --

MR. BIGELOW: Fair enough, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, but like here's -- and here's what I mean, and I'm going to -- let me back up for a minute. I do think on the issue of sort of it being late, I think we all had -- you know, we had a few discussions about this language. Most of the language, even with all the changes I proposed and made, almost all of it came, you know, from the -- you know, from the parties or, at least, a lot of it did. No one was sort of focused on that. And I do think if there was a problem on the issue of, you know, the jury not understanding that perceived rather than actual national origin could have a role in this case, that could have been brought up on closing.

But here's what I mean when I say the instructions are about the -- whether the plaintiff was discriminated against based on national origin. And here's the thing:

There -- all right. Let's look at it. So Title VII provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -- reading from page 13 -- you know, to discriminate based on national origin.

We're talking about whether there was unlawful employment discrimination against Dr. Jara based on national origin.

We're not talking about whether, you know, other -- and that's the issue in this case. It's not whether other professors that, you know, the plaintiff wants to throw

into the mix to support the notion that the plaintiff was treated badly on national origin, the jury instructions are not about whether those people were discriminated against based on national origin. It's about -- they talk about what the plaintiff must prove, and the statement in there is accurate.

The next one there, there's another reference to national origin in terms of what Title VII provides that's accurate.

Then there are further instructions on page 13 defining national origin.

Page 15: "To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin." It doesn't speak to -- so in other words, at this point, that instruction is saying here is what the plaintiff needs to prove to establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin. It does not speak to whether the jury can be suspicious of TSU and how they treated Dr. Jara based on perceived, rather than actual national origin of other professors. It just doesn't speak to that.

So that -- that's why I wouldn't -- that's why I don't think it needs to go in there to support your argument about other professors.

As to Dr. Jara, I have a few things to say, and I will let you speak when I'm done here. But a few things:

First of all, the notion of mere perception of national origin is not even applicable to Dr. Jara, right? Because he actually has the national origin that places him in a protected class. This isn't one of these cases that the EEOC is speaking to where someone is discriminated against because of perceived national origin rather than real national origin.

That would be the case, you would want to rely on that principle if Dr. Jara was saying, look, I'm

American-born but they perceive me as not American-born, and it's no defense that they were wrong that I was not

American-born, because being discriminated against based on a perception that I'm foreign-born is just as bad as discriminating against me based on the true fact that I'm foreign-born.

And that just doesn't apply in this case. That's the way I see it. But you may try and change my mind on that.

MR. BIGELOW: I will briefly do my best to do that, Your Honor. My point was this: For the first time that I heard of -- and I may be wrong -- yesterday evening at close, a lot of defendant's argument was based around the argument that defendant doesn't know that the, quote, internationals were actually internationals; not Dr. Jara, but the internationals, the group of other professors who are

looked upon by some, as the testimony showed, as
internationals.

Now, on page 14 of the verdict form -- of the jury charge, it says: "Someone who is not born in the United States is a member of a protected class for purposes of both what I will call a general discrimination claim and a hostile work environment claim under Title VII."

THE COURT: The jury doesn't have to decide whether anyone else was a member of a protected class to render a verdict in favor of Dr. Jara.

MR. BIGELOW: That is true.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BIGELOW: But my contention, plaintiff's contention, is that someone who is not born in the United States or someone who is perceived as not being born in the United States is a member of a protected class. That is -- that is our contention and -- that's our contention.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, and, you know, I -- I think -- and I do understand that. And actually, I have a few comments about that, that I'm going to make in a minute, whether that perception is true or not because it's debatable.

But, you know, the -- and I'll explain why I say it's debatable whether the perceived national origin is as good as, you know -- whether discrimination based on

perceived national origin is as actionable as discrimination based on actual national origin. But for now, I'll assume that that's accurate.

I do think we have accurate instructions, and to the extent -- and everyone agreed on them. To the extent I guess they could have been more specific by saying actual or perceived, that doesn't matter here because we have a case where the claim is not that he was discriminated against based on perceived national origin, it's actual national origin. Right?

Like, in other words -- see if you agree and I'm happy to have this discussion. So in other words, like, this is a case where he has a foreign national origin. I guess on the Dr. Jara piece, it sounds like your position is, look, it's no defense -- and maybe this is what you're saying:

Like, it's no defense if they perceived him -- maybe what you're saying is it's no defense to a claim that they discriminated against him based on national origin to say that they merely perceived him to be foreign-born without actually knowing. Is that your argument?

MR. BIGELOW: That's absolutely -- in fact, to that point, Your Honor, my argument is if Dr. Jara's parents, who are from Chile, were flying over the United States on a trip, and they just happened to stop when his mother was nine months, you know, pregnant, and they just were happened to

fly into Canada and happened to stop in the United States and he was actually born in the United States, then they went on to Canada for their vacation and flew back to Chile, well, that analysis would hold here. Like, it wouldn't matter if he was actually born in the United States or not.

THE COURT: Well, but if we look at this case, you know, all this, I think, goes to the third element of discrimination based on national origin. His national origin, which everyone knows that his national origin is foreign-born, right? Everyone knows that. So his actual foreign origin. So was a motivating factor. The jury knows that they need to find that his actual -- you know, here, it says national origin. He does have the actual national origin being foreign-born. Was a motivating factor.

Isn't it not built into that notion that if they perceived him -- if they correct -- because if they perceived the national origin, if TSU perceived the national origin, it would be an accurate perception. So his national origin was a motivating factor.

I think that encompasses the notion his national origin was -- it can't be a motivating factor unless they knew or perceived. Like, if they perceived it, it could be a motivating factor, right? Like no one said they have to know. Now, you're saying the defendant said that they had to know. I'm not sure they said that. We'll talk about it in a

minute. So maybe if we boil this down.

Mis national origin, foreign-born, was a motivating factor. A perception of what his national origin is rather than knowledge would be enough to be a motivating factor, and I think the jury would figure that out. So there's nothing in this instruction that tells them that the defendant need to actually know his national origin. Because a perception, human nature, everyone knows a perception of something can motivate actions even if people don't know. Right?

And I think -- I think you argued it just fine.

And again, no one thought it was important, and I guess

you're saying, well, I didn't know until they argued this. I

didn't know the need for the instruction.

But, I mean, I would think that would sort of -- I mean, it would have always been on the table that the defendant would say, well, we didn't know the national origin. I mean, didn't you have discovery in this case? I mean, like, is it a surprise to you that TSU's witnesses just said I didn't know their national origin. Is that a surprise to you? You know what I mean? Like, because if it wasn't, this sort of thing really needed to be accounted for on the front end.

MR. BIGELOW: I guess, Your Honor, a better application is the list that I talked about in front of the

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1
     jury.
                THE COURT:
                            Uh-huh.
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                MR. BIGELOW:
                               I do not believe that based on case
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     law -- not only the EEOC guidance but also based on case law,
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     that it matters whether the list of Dr. Najarian [phonetic]
     and Kothahanden [phonetic] -- like the long -- like Dr. --
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 7
     may I, Your Honor?
                THE COURT:
                            Yeah.
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                              I don't believe it matters that the
                MR. BIGELOW:
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     list of Sathananthan, Badamdorj, and Jara, whether we can --
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     I don't think we needed to prove necessarily that
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     Sathananthan and Badamdorj were foreign-born professors.
     They could be perceived of as --
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                THE COURT:
                            To this day, I don't know that they
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     were foreign-born, and I don't see any evidence that they
     were perceived as foreign-born. Was there a stitch of
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     evidence that anyone there was perceived as foreign-born?
                MR. BIGELOW: Absolutely.
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                THE COURT: What was it?
                              People saying that those professors
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                MR. BIGELOW:
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     need -- and they call them the internationals.
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                THE COURT:
                            Were those professors mentioned by
23
     name as falling into that category?
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                MR. BIGELOW:
                              Absolutely, yeah.
25
                            Like, do you recall -- I don't
                THE COURT:
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recall -- like -- believe me, and I don't mean to dispute it if you could point me to it, but I don't remember a witness saying, "You know what? The reference to 'they who need to speak better,' that -- you know, that was a reference to Dr. So and So and Dr. So and So."

I don't recall that, but maybe you can refresh my memory.

But again, why didn't this come up in rebuttal?

But again, why didn't this come up in rebuttal?

MR. BIGELOW: That's fair. I'll stop. That's fair.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I do want you to -- and really, I am happy to have further discussion. But as I think you can tell, I'm sort of, you know, I think, struggling with these things.

I do think that if on the front end this had been addressed, we could have had a discussion. Maybe -- maybe some language could have been included. But I think what we have is right. And making changes after closing to change instructions that are correct, even if, you know, they could be done a little differently, I really think it's problematic. And I do -- you know, if you have -- I would be interested if you have evidence saying, "The names on this list were the people specifically targeted by those comments," as opposed to the notion that, "Hey, there's a group of internationals who need to improve their speech."

I didn't -- I didn't pick up a reference in the testimony or don't recall a reference in the testimony to any particular person being referred to as targeted by those comments.

MR. BIGELOW: My argument before the Court, I believe, and in court was that I asked Dr. McMurray if he noticed any difference between the list that includes those professors who I just mentioned and the list of people like Jones and Smith or what have you. And he said: No, I don't see any difference between the two.

And that's a matter of fact admittedly. He may not. We don't believe that, but he may not in reality see any difference between the two or recognize a difference between the two.

But our point is that whether they are actually born elsewhere or not, it's a matter of perception. And I know like you said, that's the point. I'm not just making this up and saying it hasn't been argued; it has been argued. I didn't realize that defendant was going to stand up and say, hey, it doesn't matter if they were actually born here or not. There's no proof that they were not born here.

And I guess plaintiff's point, while it's -- you know, admittedly I guess a little minutia, is not whether they were actually born here or not, it's what they could -- were perceived.

I mean, he works with them. Dr. Jara testified that a number of -- he and a number of other, quote, foreign-born professors, and mentioned names, had, you know, gathered together and complained about things. And that's my point.

THE COURT: Well, here's -- here's the way I see it. I think what you're referring to here is, you think the jury should be able to infer that people on the one list were treated worse and that they were perceived as foreign-born; and that if those two things are true, that they were treated worse and perceived as foreign-born, that helps Dr. Jara's case because it would tend to indicate the kind of animus against foreign-born folks.

These instructions give the jury plenty of latitude to do exactly that even without your proposed additions. They really do. Like, when I read this, I'm -- like, for example, on the key element, "His national origin was a motivating factor," nothing in there that could prevent the jury from saying something like this.

MR. BIGELOW: Fair enough, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I'll make a couple more comments about that and then move to a slightly different topic.

But they definitely have room to say, you know what? When we're considering whether national origin was a

motivating factor, we're going to consider the names on that list, and frankly, it would be sheer speculation. It would. But they -- but that's to the plaintiff's benefit. They actually have room to speculate if they want, because I can't stop them. Even if, as judges, we don't like speculation, whatever, you can't stop. They can go in the jury room and say: You know what? We speculate that the people on this list were perceived as being foreign-born.

And that would really -- in the United States in 2022, I don't think that's a safe assumption. But they have the perfect leeway within these instructions to go along with that argument and say: Yep, yep, we're suspicious about why these people were treated differently. We think it could be because they were perceived as foreign-born, whether or not they were actually foreign-born. And that is going to contribute to a finding on our end that Dr. Jara's national origin, which is undisputed, was a motivating factor.

I think there's plenty of leeway, and I think you made the argument for them to accept it if they want it.

I think you're sort of -- part of what you're saying, Mr. Bigelow, I think, is that there was something that the defendant referred to in terms of the law that was sort of misleading that would indicate to them that they can't do that.

I don't see it that way. I did --

Do you think that you imply that the law requires for Dr. Jara to be liable, the law requires that TSU knew the national origin of particular professors?

MS. CARTER: No, Your Honor. I don't think that's what the defendant was implying at all.

THE COURT: I took it more like this, Mr. Bigelow, and I know that -- and I appreciate you're like, "Well, I'm done. I've made my peace," and I'm the one going on, so I realize that. But I do want you to know that in the limited time I had, I thought about -- I continue to think about your argument.

But, like, to me, it was more like, you know what -- the argument sounded to me more like: You know what? Mr. Bigelow's gotten up and he said, you know, hey, listen, the people on this list, you know, I thought it was more like they were foreign-born rather than they were perceived as foreign-born.

But either way, whichever way you were arguing -maybe you were arguing it both ways -- that they were
foreign-born and treated differently or they're at least
perceived as foreign-born and treated differently; the state
gets up and says: You know what? You should reject that,
and one of the reasons you should reject it is that there's
no evidence that anyone knew it.

I didn't see them -- I didn't hear them say: And

without actual knowledge of these other professors' national 1 origin, the law requires that you return a verdict for the 2 defendant. 3 4 So that's how I see it. I --5 Yes, sir? MR. BIGELOW: I suppose one of the reasons why I 6 believe that, Your Honor, is because of what I believe to be 7 the rationale of the defendant's Rule 50 motion, which I 8 thought was based on that, which --9 THE COURT: Well --10 And I may be wrong about that, but 11 MR. BIGELOW: 12 that was my understanding of it. 13 THE COURT: Well, then we get -- so then we get back to -- and their Rule 50 motion, I'm confident, doesn't 14 relate to the national origin of any other professors. 15 It's -- has something to do specifically with the third 16 17 element as it relates to Dr. Jara's national origin. 18 say? MS. CARTER: 19 Yes. Are you saying that as a matter 20 THE COURT: Okay. of law, Tennessee State can't be liable unless they knew, 21 or -- that's Option A -- Option B is: There is not 22 23 sufficient evidence that national origin was a motivating 24 And a big reason to believe there isn't sufficient

evidence that it was a motivating factor is the lack of

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evidence that they knew, that lack of evidence that anyone knew -- any decision-maker knew his national origin advances the ball pretty far down the field as to whether national origin was a motivating factor such that the state would have to rely on inferences that he was correctly perceived as being foreign-born and that -- that inference cannot be drawn based on this evidence. That's --

MS. CARTER: Yes, Option B.

That's the way I took it.

THE COURT: Option B. And I don't mean to make your argument for you. But I will say this: Mr. Bigelow is right because, you know, if it's based on the lack of knowledge -- and I don't think I heard you say if the defendant didn't know the jury -- the instructions the Judge gives you means that the defendant can't be liable. I took it as a more holistic reason, set of reasons, as to why national origin was not proven to be a motivating factor and not just, well, they got no knowledge. That's the end of it.

MS. CARTER: That's exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's -- you know, and I do think, Mr. Bigelow, like I -- it seemed to me like if you thought they misstated the law, right -- you get to speak last. And, you know, I think probably it would seem to me you would have said, "Ladies and gentlemen, they said X." And I've done this several times in trial when I was able to do rebuttal.

"Opposing counsel said X, and, ladies and gentlemen, you're going to hear from the Judge, and listen close. I bet you'll hear the Judge won't say anything like that. So you need to throw out what opposing counsel just said about the law and how it applies," you know.

And you didn't do that, and I think that's probably correctly, because I don't think they did enough for you to make that kind of argument.

MR. BIGELOW: That's fair, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Now, let me just make a couple of final points, and then we'll call in the jury. This is from my opinion in Kostic v. United States [sic], 532 F. Supp 513-534, Note 27. And I just wanted to note this for the record. The parties assumed jointly -- and this is an assumption in the plaintiff's favor -- that discrimination based on being foreign-born is discrimination based on national origin.

That's debatable because, you know, national origin seems to be -- you know, can be interpreted to mean your origin from a particular nation and not just non-American. And, of course, I realize the counterarguments.

What I said in Kostic was this: There is authority on the issue of whether a claim of national origin discrimination can be premised on others' misguided belief

that the plaintiff belongs to a particular national origin when, in fact, he or she does not. Some authority suggests that the answer is yes, that the claim can be premised on the plaintiff being perceived as, rather than actually, having a particular national origin.

And I'm sorry. I teed up that quote by focusing on the wrong thing. That quote goes to Mr. Bigelow's assertion in his brief that discrimination based on perceived rather than actual national origin is actionable under Title VII.

And the point that I wanted to make was -- and I researched this pretty thoroughly, I thought, for the Kostic opinion: It wasn't entirely clear that "perceived as" would do the trick, but there is some authority on that. And, therefore, for purposes of Mr. Bigelow's motion, even though he wasn't able to cite binding authority, I have accepted that as true, Mr. Bigelow. It's not entirely clear. There's authority to support it. I accepted it as true for purposes of your motion.

Now, the other issue that I started to mention before getting on track -- off track is I started to talk about the other issue which is whether Title VII bars discrimination based on being a foreigner generally rather than being from a particular country.

This is, I think, debatable because as a case like

John v. Walmart Stores E, Inc., which is an Eastern District of Tennessee case, 2007, Westlaw 3180099 at Star 7, notes:

Nothing in Title VII makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage.

And then it cites Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86-95, 1973, noting it would be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against aliens because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

The assertion in this particular case is that Espinoza, on the same page, supports the notion that immigrant status is an unprotected class, which means if this John case is correct and there are other cases that support the notion that immigrant status is not a protected class, that would mean being foreign-born is not a protected class for persons in the U.S. Because if you're foreign-born and you're in the U.S., you are an immigrant. If that's not a protected class, then being a foreigner generally is not a protected class.

John supports that notion. There are other cases, I've seen a bunch of them.

So I think the issue of whether being a foreigner generally makes you a member of a protected class is debatable. Both parties assumed it. I think it's a reasonable assumption. In my case of Benitez v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., which regrettably had 151 footnotes, I'm sorry

to say, Footnote 91, I talk about my view on this. It's 2022
Westlaw 1283087.

The -- what I say here is: The Court is inclined to agree with those Courts that have recognized that national origin discrimination includes not just disfavoring a single national group relative to all others, but also favoring one national group such as Americans over all others; and moreover, includes discrimination on the basis of disfavored treatment of foreigners generally.

So all I'm doing here at this point is to explain that I do realize that the very premise that both sides adopted, that being not American-born is a protected class, not entirely settled. I've accepted in the past. I find it persuasive. I accepted it here.

My prior point just a moment ago was that, again to summarize, that there is authority to support the notion that a plaintiff can have a claim for national origin discrimination even if they're incorrectly perceived as being of the national origin that places them in a protected class.

All right. So obviously, Mr. Bigelow's objection to the Court's declination to amend the charge at this late hour is preserved, but I do need to deny it because I think, you know, substantively, it has the problems I had mentioned. I think he doesn't need this remedy for the jury to do what he wants it to be able to do. And I do think it's

1 procedurally too late. Anything else we need to talk about at 2 All right. 3 this time before we bring in the jury? 4 MR. BIGELOW: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Nothing? All right. 5 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honor. 6 We can call in the jury. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: (WHEREUPON, the jury re-entered the courtroom, 8 with matters being heard in open court as follows:) 9 All right. Thanks, folks. 10 THE COURT: Please be We got you in here I know an hour after we asked you 11 12 to report, and I do apologize for that. I think I've said it 13 before, I'll say it again: It's not a reflection that we can't be bothered with being careful with your time. And it 14 doesn't mean that we were rolling in here way too late to 15 16 start on time because we were up late watching the World 17 It wasn't that, and I do want you to know Series, you know. that. Sometimes things just come up for, you know, the Court 18 19 and the attorneys to talk about, and you can't always be sure 20 when and how long. 21 So if I'd known we would start at 10:00, I would 22 have told you that. Thank you for your continued attention and service. 23 24 And at this point, we've come to the point where 25 the Court will provide you the instructions and will

additionally explain the verdict form to you. So the -- the way we'll proceed at this time, we'll hand out copies of the jury instructions, which we call the jury charge, for you to read along and follow as I read.

Okay. So you've been provided a copy, and, please, if you see fit to do so, read along with me. That can be very helpful. You will have a copy of the jury charge as well as for each of you, a copy of the jury verdict form that can go back with you.

I'm going to read the jury charge verbatim until I get to the part about just explaining the jury verdict form.

But this isn't a time for me to give a slick presentation.

It's just a time to read off the page so that we can ensure that we provide the instructions just as they should be.

The Court wants to note that each of you, as I say, has a jury verdict form. As it happens, whoever is the foreperson can use the copy that they got as what will effectively be the original verdict form, the one that will be filled out.

All right. So you'll see that we have a cover page and a page that's left intentionally blank and then a Table of Contents. After that, we have page 4, and I will read as close to verbatim as possible the instructions in this packet.

(WHEREUPON, the Court read the jury charge and

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32
     verdict form instructions to the jury. Transcription was not
 1
     requested. Further proceedings were had, as follows:)
 2
 3
                THE COURT:
                            So that concludes our jury
 4
     instructions, and at this point, you will be free to head to
 5
     the jury room. I'll ask you to step down in a minute.
     will provide, as I indicated, the advised version of the
 6
     verdict form. We will be providing also the exhibits to you
 7
     for your review.
 8
                And at this time, then, folks may step down and
 9
     head down to the deliberation room. Thank you.
10
                (WHEREUPON, the jury retired to the jury room to
11
12
     deliberate, with the following matters being heard in open
13
     court as follows:)
14
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Please be seated. All right. Any objections to the jury charge as read to the jurors?

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MR. BIGELOW: None here, Your Honor.

MS. CARTER: None here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel.

You know, one of the things about being the Judge is, before it's too late, you need to sort of, I think, make tweaks occasionally, and this one is on me. We looked at this jury form. Those last three lines there in the middle of page 2 that I wanted to strike, they were really applicable only to a prior version of the jury verdict form.

```
They need to be just struck because they don't apply to this,
 1
 2
     and so I'm confident counsel gathered that anyway, but that's
 3
     what we'll be doing.
 4
                What I'm going to do is ensure that -- that seven
 5
     copies of this revised verdict form, which we can distribute
     at this time, goes in there, and we'll be distributing right
 6
     now a copy for each of you.
 7
                Okay. Do we have any logistical matters that we
 8
     need to take up at this time, since I know that Ms. Jackson
 9
     is already on top of the cell phone notification situation
10
     and I think you're probably aware to be within, say, 15
11
     minutes of the courthouse?
12
13
                MR. BIGELOW: No logistics.
                THE COURT: Nothing from you, Mr. Bigelow?
14
                Counsel?
15
                MS. CARTER: Nothing, Your Honor.
16
17
                THE COURT:
                           All right. We -- okay. Yeah, we'll
18
     lock up the courtroom in the meantime, so you're free to
19
     leave or take your items as you see fit. And when we get a
     note from the jury, we'll let you know ASAP, be it a verdict
20
21
     or a question.
22
                All right. If nothing further, at this time,
23
     we'll stand in recess.
                             Thank you.
24
                (Recess 10:50 a.m. to 12:12 p.m.)
25
                THE COURT:
                            All right. As it happens, we are in
```

receipt of a jury note. And the Court had drafted a proposed answer, so I will read the proposed draft answer which will incorporate the substance of the jury's note:

"The Court is in receipt of a note from the jury asking the following question: If possible, may we see the section of Dr. Jackson's deposition which refers to the internationals comment?

"To this question, the Court provides the following answer: As the Court noted at trial, when a witness's deposition testimony is read at trial, it should be treated just like testimony provided by a witness in the courtroom during the trial.

"This means that just as the Court cannot provide a transcript of the testimony of a witness who testified in the courtroom during the trial, the Court cannot provide a transcript of the deposition testimony of a witness that was read at trial."

It occurs to me that since -- well, I'm thinking that I want them to know -- I think my answer should reflect that I realize that they're only asking for a small portion of the deposition, but what I'm saying applies even to a small portion.

So I'm thinking to this draft, maybe instead, we should say at the end: "The Court cannot provide a transcript of any portion of the deposition testimony of a

```
witness that was read at trial."
 1
                Does that work?
 2
 3
                MR. DALTON: Yes, Your Honor.
 4
                MR. BIGELOW:
                              I prefer you say that she mentioned
 5
     internationals twice, but that totally works for me, Your
     Honor.
 6
 7
                THE COURT:
                            Yeah. Yeah, that's the thing about
     these answers to questions. If counsel was answering them by
 8
     themselves, they may provide a very different answer indeed.
 9
                If that one works -- and I understand that counsel
10
     was able to see a draft of the Court's answer and the note
11
12
     itself; is that right?
13
                MR. BIGELOW: Yes, Your Honor.
                THE COURT: Is that right?
14
                MR. DALTON: Correct.
15
                            Okay. Good. Then it sounds like
16
                THE COURT:
17
     we're on the same page, so I'm going to make that small
18
     change after the word "of." Before "the deposition," I'm
19
     going to add "any portion of." I will sign it and send it
    back to the jury, and we'll keep you posted and let you know
20
21
     when we get our next note, whatever the purpose of the note
22
     may be.
23
                All right. If nothing further, thank you.
                                                             We'll
24
     stand in recess.
                (Recess 12:14 p.m. to 1:19 p.m.)
25
```

THE COURT: I believe that counsel have been 1 2 informed that we got a note from the jury saying that they 3 have reached a verdict, so unless there is any reason to do 4 otherwise, we will bring them in. 5 Thank you. (WHEREUPON, the jury re-entered the courtroom, 6 with matters being heard in open court as follows:) 7 THE COURT: All right. Thanks, folks. Please be 8 seated. 9 Mr. Maxwell, looks like we've received a note from 10 you saying: "Judge Richardson, the jury has reached a 11 12 verdict." And is that, in fact, the case, the jury has 13 reached a verdict? JURY FOREPERSON MAXWELL: It is, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. You may 15 16 hand it to the court security officer. 17 All right. I'm going to read the jury verdict form verbatim, and then I will poll the jury, and then I'll 18 19 publish the verdict form to counsel. Jury Verdict. We, the jury, answers the Questions 20 21 submitted by the Court as follows: 22 Questions as to liability. Question 1: 23 Plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, his 24 general discrimination claim that Defendant discriminated 25 against him by failing to appoint him to the position of

```
Chair of the Department of Mathematical Sciences due in part
 1
     to (motivated by) his national origin?
 2
 3
                No.
 4
                Question 2: Did Plaintiff prove, by a
 5
     preponderance of the evidence, his general discrimination
     claim that Defendant discriminated against him by diminishing
 6
     his options for advancement due in part to (motivated by) his
 7
     national origin?
 8
                No.
 9
                Question 3: Did Plaintiff prove, by a
10
     preponderance of the evidence, his general discrimination
11
12
     claim that Defendant discriminated against him by withholding
13
     his pay after questioning his signature on certain of his
     time sheets due in part to (motivated by) his national
14
15
     origin?
16
                No.
17
                Question 4: Did Plaintiff prove, by a
18
     preponderance of the evidence, that he was subjected to a
     hostile work environment based on his national origin?
19
20
                No.
                The verdict is signed by the foreperson dated
21
22
     November the 4th, 2022.
23
                Now, here is what I'm going to do. I'm going to
24
     go juror by juror and ask whether it's your verdict.
25
                Mr. Maxwell, is this your verdict?
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1
                JURY FOREPERSON MAXWELL: It is, Your Honor.
 2
                THE COURT: All right. Mr. Michie, is this your
 3
     verdict?
 4
                JUROR MICHIE: It is, Your Honor.
                THE COURT:
                            Ms. Shockley, is this your verdict?
 5
                JUROR SHOCKLEY: It is, Your Honor.
 6
                THE COURT: Mr. Melcher, is this your verdict?
 7
                JUROR MELCHER: It is, Your Honor.
 8
                THE COURT: And, Mr. Daugherty, is this your
 9
    verdict?
10
11
                JUROR DAUGHERTY: Yes, Your Honor.
12
                THE COURT: And, Ms. Hobson, is this your verdict?
                JUROR HOBSON:
                               It is, Your Honor.
13
                THE COURT: And, Ms. Hutchings, is this your
14
    verdict?
15
16
                JUROR HUTCHINGS: It is, Your Honor.
                THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I will have
17
     the verdict form published to counsel tables.
                                                    Thank you.
18
                All right. Mr. Bigelow, is there any reason why
19
20
     this jury cannot be discharged at this time?
21
                MR. BIGELOW: None, Your Honor.
22
                THE COURT: All right. And be it Mr. Dalton or
23
    Ms. Carter, any reason why the jury cannot be discharged at
24
     this time?
                             No, Your Honor.
25
                MS. CARTER:
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MR. DALTON: No.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right, folks. Wanted to thank you for your service. You've spent the better part of four days of your life vindicating the plaintiff's and the defendant's right to a jury trial in something that was, of course, very important to each side. And that system doesn't work and these people are unable to have their rights vindicated unless you take your time and set it aside to serve. We're very, very grateful for that.

What I would say at this point is as follows: You are welcome to leave as soon as we dismiss you. On the other hand, if you'd be willing to stick around for a few minutes in the jury room, I'd love to come in and extend my thanks; and also, what is important to me particularly in the early days, which we're still in in this courthouse, see what your experience was like in the building. That helps us know how things are going as we do things in terms of jury trials in a somewhat different way in a new building compared to the one that this Court was in since like 1937.

And that feedback would be very helpful, and we'd like to know if there are things we can do to improve the juror experience as well.

So again, it's not required at all, but if you'd be willing to do that, I'd love to speak with you in just a

few minutes.

For those that are departing, I believe that we're still doing the process of them checking out in the jury assembly room on the first floor, and you may have your cell phones there as well.

So at this time, the jurors may step down, again, with our thanks.

(WHEREUPON, the jury was excused from the courtroom and discharged from further service, with the following matters being heard in open court as follows:)

THE COURT: Thanks. Please be seated. Just a few more things here. And the way these things sometimes go, one side is disappointed and the other side is very satisfied.

I want to not keep anyone here longer than is necessary, but I do want to make a couple of comments about the trial. I think the issues here were able to be vetted in an appropriate manner, and the jury has spoken how it's spoken.

I wanted to commend counsel for, you know, I think conducting themselves in trial in a civil manner. And I think the other thing is that both sides, it seemed to me, were never really fighting just to fight. They were able to agree on certain things like the initial jury instructions. They didn't seem to be deciding to dig in their heels on something just to make a point, and that was certainly

noticed and appreciated by the Court.

You know, and I think Mr. Bigelow alluded a few times, and I think as he put it, he was just trying to be nice. The way I would put it from his side, and sometimes from the defense side as well, you know, he was making reasonable accommodations that I think are helpful to the process, so kudos to counsel for that.

The other thing I did want to just say, and it's something to keep in mind for future trials: What I saw here was a case where it mattered to the parties whether something had been on an exhibit or a witness list. There were a lot of documents coming up to the witness stand that were not admitted into evidence or offered into evidence, and some of those were not on an exhibit list.

And for that reason, because I wasn't sure what some of these documents were doing coming up to the exhibit stand, I wanted to know and keep track of that. I was a bit of a stickler on what was being done with documents, if it wasn't strictly being just offered into evidence.

It probably seemed at times like I was being a stickler, but I think it's important for the Court to know, keep everyone clear, if a document that's not just, hey, it's a document being offered for admission, if it's coming up to the witness stand, appropriate for the Court to clarify what it's coming in for and that -- or what it's being used for

and to make sure that sort of the process of it being used is reasonably followed.

And so that's, I think, important to notice to why this particular trial was a little bit more, in my experience, a little bit more noteworthy in terms of me sort of managing some of the stuff that happened up at the witness stand between the witness and counsel.

All right. As I say, the jury has spoken, and I wanted to ask whether anyone anticipated any post-trial motions as to which it would behoove the Court at this time to set a briefing schedule.

MR. BIGELOW: Just for the record, we ask your judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Your Honor. Just preserve that.

THE COURT: Just to preserve it. All right. And that -- for preservation purposes, that is -- that is preserved.

I would say this: I will deny the motion at this time on the grounds that, you know, the plaintiff presented evidence, and I don't think I have to say whether the evidence was sufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. I will say there was evidence admitted by the plaintiff that certainly goes towards each of the four counts -- well, four claims. We have three that were general claims of discrimination, one for each of three different adverse

employment actions, and then the fourth that was the hostile work environment. So the -- you know, the plaintiff submitted evidence that certainly went towards each of those counts.

And without saying, oh, the evidence would have been sufficient, I don't need to speculate about that.

I will say that the way the evidence came in, that a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff did not meet the burden that the plaintiff bears, even though it's only by a preponderance.

And the third element of each of the three general discrimination claims, you know, does require a finding of a particular motivation, particular adverse employment actions motivated by Dr. Jara's national origin being born outside the United States, and a reasonable jury could find it wasn't a motivating factor that each and every motivating factor was something else, and I think a reasonable jury could have found that.

On hostile work environment, certainly, there were some things that the plaintiff offered that would go towards a claim like that. On the other hand, a reasonable jury could have found that not all elements were met. I think it could have found that not many of the circumstances that plaintiff thought contributed to a hostile work environment were based on national origin, and that for any that were --

Let's put it this way: A reasonable jury could, even if it did find that some instances of unpleasant conduct were based on hostile work environment, a reasonable jury could find it didn't rise to the level of pervasiveness and severity of negative employment experience and ridicule and so forth based on national origin. It didn't have that level of severity and pervasiveness for a jury to find that it resulted in a hostile work environment based on national origin.

And again, that's not to say that a reasonable jury could not have gone the other way. It is to say that a reasonable jury could have reached the defense verdict it did on each of the four claims here.

All right. Anything further, Mr. Bigelow?

MR. BIGELOW: Nothing here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Counsel?

MR. DALTON: Thank you.

MS. CARTER: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. And this matter, I will note, will be at the point where the Court will enter a judgment on the jury verdict in the forthcoming days, so you can look for that in terms of the documentation of this case and how it was terminated.

Yes, Mr. Bigelow?

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MR. BIGELOW: No, I'm just listening to
1
2
     Your Honor.
                THE COURT: Okay, gotcha. Just standing up.
 3
 4
     Okay.
 5
                Again, counsel, I am gratified to say that I think
     we were able to give each side its day in court and allow the
 6
     jury to speak, and that's our system.
7
                All right. Thank you, counsel. We stand in
 8
 9
     recess.
                 (WHEREUPON, the foregoing proceedings were
10
11
     concluded at 1:34 p.m.)
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## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Deborah K. Watson, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, with offices at Nashville, do hereby certify:

That I reported on the Stenograph machine the proceedings held in open court on November 4, 2022, in the matter of <u>PATRICIO JARA vs. TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY</u>, Case No. 3:20-cv-00131; that said proceedings in connection with the hearing were reduced to typewritten form by me; and that the foregoing transcript (Trial Volume IV of IV, pages 1 through 45) is a true and accurate record of said proceedings.

This the 11th day of February, 2023.

/s/ Deborah K. Watson
DEBORAH K. WATSON, RPR, CRR
Official Court Reporter